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Introduction
International capital flows are central to international macroeconomics. The interaction between the monetary and exchange rate policies of a country depends upon its stance towards capital mobility, as described by the policy trilemma. The ability of a government and its citizens to borrow and lend abroad allows domestic investment to diverge from domestic savings, which can promote economic efficiency and growth. In addition, international portfolio diversification is a potentially important means by which individuals can smooth consumption and undertake risky investments that would otherwise be unattractive. On a less salutary note, international capital flows are also blamed for being an important vector through which economic disturbances are spread across countries, or as a means by which investors prompt a sudden stop that causes an economy to crash. 
." (The Economic Consequences of the
The Great Recession has spurred a further reevaluation of the appropriate role of capital controls. Countries as diverse as Brazil and Switzerland considered (and in the case of Brazil, implemented) controls on inflows in the face of currency appreciation, while Iceland introduced controls on outflows at the time of its crisis. A number of recent IMF staff studies and policy papers accept the use of capital controls as part of a country's "policy toolkit" under certain circumstances, a shift that The Economist magazine dubbed "The Reformation."
2 Even stronger calls for a greater role for capital controls include Jeanne, Subramanian and Williamson (2012) and Rey (2013) . Some of these policy prescriptions are consistent with a new branch of theoretical research in which capital controls contribute to financial stability and macroeconomic management. 3 The empirical research of others, however, emphasizes the ineffectiveness and potential costs of capital controls. 4 The evolving nature of the debate on capital controls, and the policy prescriptions that follow, suggest that further careful empirical analysis is needed. One challenge facing empirical researchers in this area concerns the availability of indicators of capital controls. Although some empirical research addresses this challenge by considering the experience of a specific country, 5 broader, cross-country analyses require panel data reflecting the experience of a range of countries. While a number of panel datasets exist, those with broad time and/or country coverage are typically hampered by a lack of granularity (for example, Chinn and Ito, 2006, and Quinn, 1997) , often providing little information beyond a broad index of "capital account openness,"
while others with finer granularity have been more limited in terms of sample coverage (such as Schindler, 2009 , Miniane, 2004 , and Tamirisa, 1999 In this paper, we introduce a new dataset based on the methodology in Schindler (2009) , but including more countries, more asset categories and more years. In particular, the new dataset reports the presence or absence of capital controls, on an annual basis, for 100 countries over the period 1995 to 2013. As discussed in greater detail below, this dataset revises, extends, and widens the dataset originally developed by Schindler (2009) , and later expanded by Klein (2012) and Fernández, Rebucci and Uribe (2014) . This dataset's wide range of countries and its coverage of a period of changing policies make it a potentially important resource for research and policy. 7 In particular, a distinguishing and important feature of these data is that the information on capital controls is disaggregated both by whether the controls are on inflows or outflows, and by 10 different categories of assets. This allows for a more detailed analysis of capital controls, including an examination of the co-movements of controls on different types of assets, and on the co-movements of controls on inflows and outflows, as well as the construction of aggregate measures of controls that are well targeted to the specific nature of the topic being studied.
Variations of such aggregate measures across time serve as one indicator of the intensity of the application of restrictions on international capital movements.
The next section of the paper discusses the methods used to develop this dataset from annual information published by the IMF. In Section 3 we discuss some statistics of our disaggregated dataset, including the correlation across categories of assets and directions of transactions (that is, controls on inflows or on outflows). Section 4 discusses issues related to aggregating the asset categories and also compares an aggregated index of our data with two aggregate indicators that are commonly used in panel estimation, those first introduced in Quinn (1997) and in Chinn and Ito (2006) . We offer some concluding comments in Section 5.
Constructing the Capital Control Indicators
Cross-country time series of capital controls typically draw from the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 8 The capital control measures presented in this paper are also based on the de jure information from this source. 9 There was a fundamental change in the reporting on capital controls beginning with the 1996 volume of the 7 The dataset will be publicly available on several websites, including that of the National Bureau of Economic Research (see www.nber.org/data) 8 The early works that use the AREAER to create panel datasets of capital controls include Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) , Quinn (1997) and Chinn and Ito (2006). 9 That is, the measures capture legal restrictions, but not whether or to what extent they are enforced. One difficulty in trying to construct empirically-based de facto indicators of capital account restrictions is that there is not a clear benchmark of the gross capital flows consistent with free capital mobility. Furthermore, de facto indicators based on the equalization of rates of return would assume efficient markets, and require making assumptions about investors' expectations and preferences as well as the correlations of asset returns with other measures of risk.
AREAER (providing information for conditions in 1995) when it began including more detailed information both across a disaggregated set of assets and by distinguishing between controls on outflows and controls on inflows; thus our data series begin in 1995 and currently include data through 2013. 10 In this section we describe the dataset we have constructed and discuss the methods we have taken to translate the narrative in the annual volumes into a panel dataset.
The present work revises, extends, and widens the dataset originally developed by Schindler (2009) , and later expanded by Klein (2012) and Fernández, Rebucci and Uribe (2014 The dataset discussed in this paper extends currently available data in three dimensions; asset categories, countries, and sample period. The four new asset categories are derivatives, commercial credit, financial guarantees, and real estate. Derivatives are of particular interest,
given their increasing role in international transactions (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007) . The nine new countries were selected through a population-based criterion, bringing the total number of countries to 100. 11 The sample period has been extended to cover the period 1995 to 2013.
This paper also provides the specific set of rules used for coding the narrative in the AREAER reports in order to generate the data. These rules are explained in detail below, and in even greater detail in a technical appendix that will be available online. The rules build on those used by Schindler (2009) . We clarify the rules, and provide explicit criteria, in order to facilitate future updates of the dataset. These rules are also used to revise some of the observations in 10 There is very limited coverage for the years 1995 and 1996 for one category of assets, controls on bonds with maturity of greater than one year, and so the data series for this asset begins in 1997. 11 The nine added countries were those with the largest populations in 2012 (according to the World Development Indicators) that were not in the original Schindler dataset, but were included in the AREAER. The four series for each of the five categories of assets mm, bo, eq, ci, and de have the suffixes _plbn, _siar, _pabr or _siln. Real Estate is represented by the three series re_pabr, re_slbn and re_plbn. The suffixes for the three series gs, fc, and cc represent inflow or outflow controls (e.g., gsi and gso, respectively).
We use the narrative description in the AREAER to determine whether or not there are restrictions on international transactions, with 1 representing the presence of a restriction and 0 representing no restriction.
14 This requires a set of rules on interpreting the information presented in these narratives. We formulated rules consistent with those used for the original Schindler the first listing the asset subcategory, the second containing a YES (that is, a restriction is in place), a NO, or no entry, and the third including narrative information. When coding each subcategory we first look at the information in both columns two and three of the reports and follow these criteria:
i. If there is no narrative information in the third column we code on the basis of the information in the second column where we assign a 0 for NO and a 1 for YES.
ii. If there is information in the third column we code based on the narrative information in that column.
2. A control is deemed to be in place when the narrative information alludes to a transaction explicitly requiring "authorization," "approval," "permission," or "clearance" from a public institution. However, a requirement of "reporting," "registration," or "notification" is not counted as constituting a control.
3. A quantity restriction on any investment (e.g., in the form of "ceiling") is coded as a control. In addition, an explicit allusion to a restriction for "prudential" considerations is deemed to be a control.
14 The AREAER narrative is limited to either n.r. or n.a. in about 2.8 percent of the cases in our data. The entry n.a. is used by the IMF "when it is unclear whether a particular category or measure exists-because pertinent information is not available at the time of publication." (IMF, 2011: page 59) The entry n.r. is used when "members have provided the IMF staff with information that a category or an item is not regulated." In addition, our dataset has the category d.n.e. that represents "does not exist" to document the cases where there is no information whatsoever, but this appears only 15 times in the entire dataset (0.03 percent of the dataset). The dataset available on line retains the n.r., n.a., and d.n.e. entries, but in the statistics presented in this paper we set to missing an entry with any of these three classifications. 15 A more detailed description of our rules and guiding principles is contained in the Technical Appendix, which is to be published separately.
4. Restrictions on a particular asset that prevent capital flows from and into specific countries on the basis of political or national security reasons are not considered capital controls.
5. When there is a restriction specifically for transactions for only one sector (except the financial system or for pension funds) and/or when that restriction is for an area reserved for state control (such as defense, security, central banking, etc.) that restriction is not categorized as a capital control. If, on the other hand, the restriction does not specify which areas other than defense are reserved for state control, then the restriction is categorized as a control.
Restrictions are counted as a capital control if they cover more than one sector in which private entrepreneurship is common, and these restrictions are deemed to have a macroeconomic impact.
There are a variety of ways to aggregate these data series in order to obtain a smaller set of indicators than the full set of 32 categories presented in 
Characteristics of the Capital Control Indicators
In this section, we present some characteristics of the capital control data. We begin by considering the properties of inflow and outflow controls for the 10 asset categories. We then discuss aggregating these series into broader indicators that reflect the average level of controls for the full set of assets, or for subsets consisting of two or more categories. We conclude this section with an estimation of the correlation between our broad capital control indicator and two other popular indicators of aggregate capital controls.
The dataset covers 100 countries over the period 1995 to 2013. The list of countries, by
World Bank Income Group, is presented in There will be further discussion of this classification below, but the basic point is that an Open country has virtually no capital controls on any asset category over the sample period, a Wall country has pervasive controls across all, or almost all, categories of assets and a Gate country uses capital controls episodically.
We begin by considering the prevalence of controls, by asset/direction categories (where direction refers to whether the control is on inflows or outflows). The detailed nature of our dataset permits an examination of differences across these categories. These differences could be important because the effects of policies may vary depending upon whether controls are targeted towards inflows or outflows of particular classes of assets. Broad indicators of capital controls that do not distinguish across asset categories, or even between controls on inflows and controls on outflows, will mask potentially important variations in the types of controls. A more detailed analysis by asset/direction category is presented in Table 3 . The first set of columns shows the average control values (0, ½ or 1) for those 11 asset/direction categories that have two components for inflows or outflows, and the second set of columns shows the number of cases where controls are absent or present for the 10 asset/direction categories that The detailed nature of our dataset enables us to consider, along with differences in the prevalence of controls across asset/direction categories, the correlation of controls across these categories. 17 This is of interest for a number of reasons, including how governments choose to pair controls across asset categories or between those on inflows and those on outflows, and whether such pairings strengthen the overall effect of policies. Table 4 presents correlations across the 10 asset categories that are listed in its rows and columns. The diagonal cells of the 17 The correlations are across all observations, that is, across all pairs x(t), y(t), where x and y represent asset/direction categories and t represents the time period. Correlations will be missing if the variance of an indicator is zero, but, in practice, there are relatively few instances of this, even among the Open and Walls categories. Zero variances would be more prevalent if we first calculated correlations for each country, that is the correlation of x(i,t) and y(i,t) where i represents a country, and then take the average of these correlations across countries to calculate the overall correlation. The table shows that the correlation between inflow controls and outflow controls for a given asset tends to be high. The highest correlation between inflow and outflow controls is for Derivatives (86 percent) and the lowest is for Direct Investment (37 percent) and Real Estate (30 percent). This result echoes that obtained by Fernández, Rebucci and Uribe (2014) , who show that the cyclical components of capital controls on inflows and outflows are positively correlated.
The correlation between asset categories, for both inflow controls and outflow controls, is highest among Money Market Instruments, Bonds, Equities, Collective Investments, and Derivatives. The lowest correlations are found for inflow controls between Real Estate and each of the other nine categories of assets. More broadly, the correlations are higher among the asset categories for outflow controls than for inflow controls.
Countries that had almost no controls for any category over the entire sample period, as well as countries that had controls on virtually all assets in every year, will contribute to larger values of the correlations in Table 4 . We call these Open countries and Wall countries, respectively, following Klein (2012) . In particular, the 36 countries in the Open category (which includes 24 of the 42 High Income countries) each had capital controls on less than 15 percent of their asset/direction categories over the sample period and had no year in which capital controls were in place on more than 25 percent of the categories. The 16 countries in the Wall category (which includes 11 of the 26 Lower Middle Income and Low Income countries) each had controls on at least 70 percent of their asset/transaction categories and had no year in which capital controls were in place on less than 60 percent of the categories. The 48 countries that are neither Open nor Wall are classified as Gate countries. As mentioned above, Table 1 notes the classification of each country in terms of these three categories. Table 5A presents the correlations across asset/direction categories for the 48 Gate countries and Table 5B presents these correlations for the 52 Open and Wall countries. As expected, the correlations for the Gate countries are lower than those of the other countries, with only one greater than 80 percent (red cell) and 40 less than 40 percent (yellow cells, and cells without highlighting). In contrast, all the correlations in Table 5B among outflows are greater than 80 percent, and the majority of those among inflows (but for correlations with real estate) greater than 60 percent, with a fifth of the inflow restriction correlations greater than 80 percent. 
Aggregate Indicators
The correlations presented in Tables 4 and 5 is the comparable control on outflows of the j th asset category for the i th country in year t. We cannot plot the evolution for all 100 countries, however, so we take the average value for each of the four income groups;
High, Upper Middle, Lower Middle and Low. Figures 2a and 2b present the plots of these four aggregate series for controls on inflows and controls on outflows, respectively. Figures 2a and 2b show that, on average, the capital control index is inversely related to income. Specifically, the left axis in each figure is for the High Income group, and its midpoint is about 0.15 in Figure 2a and 0.17 in Figure 2b while midpoints of the right axes, which pertain to the other three groups, is about 0.53 and 0.60, respectively. This difference is not surprising,
given the relatively large proportion of High Income countries that are classified as Open, and the relatively higher proportion of countries in the other three groups that are classified as Gate or Wall countries. This is also consistent with the findings of Fernandez, Uribe and Rebucci (2014), who found an inverse relation between capital controls and income levels, although their findings came from a more limited sample in terms of assets, countries and years. We begin by examining the correlation between the average of inflows and outflows of a single asset with that of an average of an aggregate of the inflows and outflows of the other nine assets. The series KC9 i,t excludes direct investment, both because it is less correlated with the other assets than almost any other series and because controls on direct investment often reflect noneconomic considerations. The series KC5 i,t includes Money Market Instruments, Bonds, Equities, Collective Investments, and Derivatives, five series that are relatively highly correlated. The narrowest category, KC2 i,t , includes only controls on fixed income assets, Money Market Instruments and Bonds. Table 7 presents the correlations across these categories for the full set of countries (the six upper triangular elements of the table) and the Gate countries only (the six lower triangular elements) for these four aggregate indicators. The correlations are very high for the full set of countries, with a range from 0.924 (for the correlation between KC10 and KC2) to 0.995 (for the correlation between KC9 and KC10). The correlations among these aggregates for the Gate countries are, naturally, lower than the respective correlations for the full set of countries, and there is also a greater range of values. For example, the correlation between the two-asset and 10-asset indicators is 0.873. In contrast, the difference in the correlation of the two-asset and five-asset indicators between the full sample (0.971) and the sample of Gate countries (0.953) is not nearly as large. Thus, there could be differences in the estimated effect of capital controls in an analysis in which the identification depends upon the pattern of controls for Gate countries. Plots of the regression lines, and the scatter plots of the points, are presented in the two panels of Figure 4 . We identify the country associated with each point for which the absolute value of the regression error is greater than 0.25 for the regression for the Quinn indicator, and 0.20 for the Chinn-Ito regression.
In both of these regressions, the coefficient on KC10 i is significantly different from zero at very high levels of confidence. But the more relevant test is whether these coefficients are significantly different from 1. The t-statistic for this test in the regression with the Chinn-Ito indicator is 1.71 and the t-statistic for the Quinn regression is 7.21. Thus, the null hypothesis that the coefficients equal 1 can be rejected at the 95 percent level of confidence in both cases, but not at the 90 percent level of confidence in the case of the Chinn-Ito indicator. 18 The average values of KC10 i used in the regressions are calculated using annual data only for those countries that have data for the Quinn and the Chinn-Ito indices in the respective years (the averages KC10 i are different for the Quinn and Chinn-Ito regressions since these two indices have different country coverage in each year). The sample period used to calculate these averages is 1995 to 2012.
Conclusions
The role that capital controls should play in countries' macroeconomic toolkits remains one of the most hotly contested issues in discussions on the international monetary system. The shift among some policymakers and researchers towards a greater acceptance of these rules and regulations in the wake of the economic and financial turmoil of the past few years contrasts with the views of others that many of these policies are ineffective and cause unintended consequences. Properly addressing the continuing controversies surrounding this topic requires careful, high-quality theoretical and empirical research.
We contribute to this debate by making available a new dataset, described in this paper, which will enable more detailed and wider-ranging empirical investigations of capital controls and their effects. In this paper we have illustrated and explained the data construction. We also present some of the basic properties of the granular data as well as those of aggregates built up from the individual data series. Our hope is that this dataset proves useful in moving forward our understanding of this important topic. 
